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THE BLACK HOLES OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, THIRD 
EDmON, VOLUME I. By Laurence H. Tribe.1 The 
Foundation Press, Inc. 1999. Pp. 1381. $47.50. 
Eric J. Segalf 
It has been a little more than ten years since Professor 
Laurence Tribe published the Second Edition of American Con-
stitutional Law, and now he has returned with the Third Edition 
(Volume 1). The prior versions of the treatise have already been 
reviewed by some of this country's most respected constitutional 
law thinkers.3 This extensive scholarship raises the question 
whether there is anything left to say about Professor Tribe's 
project that would be helpful and important. For the following 
reasons, I believe American Constitutional Law is worthy of fur-
ther evaluation. 
First, the Supreme Court has decided a number of impor-
tant cases over the last ten years, especially in the federalism and 
separation of powers arenas. This review will critique parts of 
Professor Tribe's treatise that could not have been included in 
previous editions.4 
1. Ralph S. Tyler, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University Law 
School. 
2. Professor of Law, Georgia State College of Law. I would like to thank Neal 
Devins, Neil Kinkopf, Sandy Levinson, Mike Paulsen, Paul Milich, and Steve Karnin-
shine for helpful comments. 
3. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Book Review, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 340 (1978); 
Robert F. Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1174 (1979); Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-
Tribe, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 694 (1980); Telford Taylor, Book Review, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1209 
(1979); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Tribe's Agenda, ABA J. 151 (May 1, 1988); Ira C. 
Lupu, Risky Business, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1303 (1988); Frederick Schauer, Constitutional 
Conventions, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1407 (1989). 
4. Volume I deals mostly with federalism, separation of powers, and justiciability 
issues. There are also sections on Lochner, the Privileges and Immunities Oause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and constitutional interpretation. Volume II will be concerned 
with equal protection, due process, and various other individual rights. Normally, I 
would never review a work until it is complete. However, since Professor Tribe felt free 
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Second, the third edition includes one hundred new pages 
on the legitimacy of judicial review. In this part of the book, 
Professor Tribe raises fundamental questions about the various 
modes of constitutional interpretation. Unfortunately, this new 
section is disappointing because it is limited to generalizations 
about traditional legal doctrine that have little application to 
how the Supreme Court actually decides constitutional cases. 
This review will argue that Professor Tribe overstates signifi-
cantly the role that text, tradition, history, and precedent play in 
constitutional interpretation. 
Third, I am going to take a different approach to Professor 
Tribe's discussion of case law than most of my predecessors. 
The reviewers of the first two editions generally summarized and 
critiqued two or three sections of the book while explaining why 
his or her solution to a specific constitutional problem was better 
than Professor Tribe's. I doubt many people care what I think 
about discreet constitutional law issues, and most of the readers 
of this review already know how Professor Tribe would resolve 
most constitutional questions. Therefore, instead of summariz-
ing and critiquing his substantive views, I will identify a serious 
problem with his mode of analysis that renders much of the 
normative argument in the treatise unsatisfactory for precisely 
the same reason so many of the Supreme Court's cases consis-
tently disappoint constitutional law scholars. I will label this dif-
ficulty the "black hole" problem. 
The dictionary definition of a black hole is "a hypothetical 
invisible region in space with a small diameter and intense gravi-
tational field that is held to be caused by the collapse of a mas-
sive star."5 I will use the phrase "black hole" metaphorically to 
refer to a difficult problem raised by a constitutional controversy 
that the Court ignores or fails to recognize but when exposed by 
a critic renders the Court's analysis unpersuasive. In light of the 
open texture of the traditional sources of constitutional doctrine, 
the "gravitational" pull of these black holes inevitably swallows 
the asserted justifications for many of the Court's decisions. 
Professor Tribe's treatise is also replete with black holes, 
both when he proposes solutions to specific constitutional prob-
to publish the first half separately from the ~co~d, and because we are tal~n~ about 
1381 pages, my normal reservations about reVIeWing half a book have been s1gruficantly 
dissipated. . . 
5. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 156 (Memam-Webster, 9th ed. 
1991). 
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lems and when he discusses the legitimacy of judicial review. In 
this regard, the book is a perfect reflection of how the Supreme 
Court decides constitutional cases, and yet another reminder of 
how those who write about constitutional law have failed to de-
velop a coherent response to the problem of legal indetermi-
nacy.6 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
The Third Edition of American Constitutional Law contains 
a lengthy new section discussing the "competing and comple-
mentary approaches to constitutional interpretation . . . [and] 
explores the relationship of those approaches to one another and 
to alternative theories of what the Constitution is for and of 
what, if anything, makes it (and the judiciary's power to enforce 
it) 'legitimate."' (p. v) Despite this characterization of this new 
section, Professor Tribe also states that "political and moral 
philosophy" are "deliberately relegate[ d) to the periphery" of his 
book. (p. 1 n.1) Furthermore, he concedes that the treatise does 
not focus on the problem that "constitutional adjudication is es-
pecially problematic-is not judging in the ordinary sense-and 
therefore that constitutional law is always open to the worry that 
Supreme Court justices routinely exceed their office." (p. 3) By 
page three of the book, therefore, the reader is told that Ameri-
can Constitutional Law contains a new section on constitutional 
interpretation and "what (if anything) ... make[s] [it] legiti-
mate," (p. 1) but the book is going to largely ignore issues of 
moral and political philosophy and not directly address whether 
Supreme Court Justices "exceed their office" because "constitu-
tional adjudication is especially problematic." When I read this 
section, I wondered how Professor Tribe could discuss constitu-
tional interpretation and the legitimacy of judicial review with-
out discussing political philosophy or whether constitutional ad-
judication is especially problematic. 
To accomplish his goals, Professor Tribe provides separate 
discussions of text, structure, original intent, normative and 
pragmatic argument, and precedent. Each section follows a con-
sistent pattern. Professor Tribe raises difficult questions about 
6. I read American Constitutional Law from beginning to end. It is possible, how-
ever, that Professor Tribe did not intend his treatise to be read continuously but rather 
assumed his readers would use the book as a resource on discrete legal issues. Therefore, 
it may not be fair to judge the book in the context of reading it cover to cover. I have 
tried to keep this in mind in framing my comments. 
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the relationship between each mode of interpretation and consti-
tutional analysis, and then purports to say some rather definitive 
things about how those who interpret the Constitution should 
use each mode. The problem is that every chapter contains 
statements about the modes of interpretation that are inconsis-
tent with each other, with specific constitutional outcomes he de-
fends, or both. The result is that Professor Tribe evades most of 
the truly difficult issues raised by the Supreme Court's exercise 
of judicial review. 
Professor Tribe begins with the text of the Constitution and 
argues that "[i]n all of what follows, the constitutional text is 
taken as authoritative in the sense that anything flatly contrary to 
it cannot stand, even if not as invariably exhaustive of the uni-
verse of constitutional meaning." (p. 38) Professor Tribe rejects 
the "realist" claim that the text of the document "may be dis-
carded by desuetude and in any event represents supreme law 
only when actual practices conform to it." (p. 35) 
This is a nice description of textualism most judges would 
happily embrace. Unfortunately, when applied to actual cases 
and controversies, it does little work and is not entirely accurate. 
For example, in his chapter on textual analysis, Professor Tribe 
argues that the current Supreme Court's reading of the Eleventh 
Amendment (that it prohibits federal question suits against the 
states unless Congress acts pursuant to Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, even suits brought by in-state citizens) is in-
consistent with the Amendment's clear text, which provides the 
following: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. "7 
Professor Tribe's proposed interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment, however, that would allow Congress to authorize 
all federal question suits against the states, (pp. 547-55) is 
equally inconsistent with the text of the Eleventh Amendment, 
which unambiguously prohibits all lawsuits against a state by an 
out-of-state citizen, with no exception for federal question suits. 
A person who would allow such suits in clear contradiction to 
the text cannot also endorse the idea that "the constitutional text 
is taken as authoritative in the sense that anything flatly contrary 
to it cannot stand." Yet, Professor Tribe takes both positions 
7. U.S. Const., Amend. XI (emphasis added). 
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and makes little effort to reconcile them. A true analysis of the 
relationship between the role of clear text in constitutional in-
terpretation and real life controversies falls into a black hole. 
Similarly, Professor Tribe purports to adopt a rigid textual-
ist-formalist approach to most separation of powers cases.8 He 
cites with approval the language from INS v. Chadha/ that Arti-
cle I contains a "single, finely wrought and exhaustively consid-
ered procedure" for national lawmaking. (p. 749) And, in his 
rejection of Bruce Ackerman's theory that the New Deal 
amounted to an informal constitutional amendment, he argues 
the following: 
The form of reasoning employed to discover constitution-
ally ... acceptable modes of Constitution-changing could cer-
tainly be used at least as easily to conclude ... that laws might 
be passed for the entire country by bodies other than Con-
gress ... [because] [o]nce one endorses a mode of interpreting 
structural provisions like Article V that is as loose and uncon-
strained as is the mode these arguments entail, we're off to 
the races and it's anybody's guess where we might end up. 
This is one reason that "the most plausible way of reading the 
Constitution as a legal text ... [is] to read as exclusive those 
provisions that specify how elements of the supreme law of the 
land are to be adopted." (p. 107) (emphasis added) 
This reliance on textual analysis when interpreting the Con-
stitution's structural provisions rings hollow, however, inasmuch 
as there is no serious discussion in the book of the inconsistency 
between the current Administrative state and Article l's com-
mand that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress of the United States .... "10 The Executive Branch 
exercises "legislative powers" through regulatory activities pur-
suant to extremely broad delegated powers and has done so for a 
long time. A "realist" might even suggest that Article l's unam-
biguous directive has in fact been "discarded by desuetude" and 
no longer reflects "supreme law" because "actual practices [no 
longer] conform to it." (p. 35) Any discussion of the relation-
ship between textual analysis and actual constitutional practice 
should try to make sense of this problem, especially one that 
suggests unambiguous text is supreme. American Constitutional 
Law, however, contains no such attempt. 
8. See notes 21-31 and accompanying text. 
9. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
10. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 1. 
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Professor Tribe's discussion of originalism takes a similar 
path. He poses the question as follows: "[W]hat weight should 
we give to what we know of 'original' understandings of constitu-
tional language?" (p. 48) He begins to answer this question by 
agreeing with Ronald Dworkin that the relevant original mean-
ing is not what specific results the framers expected but rather 
what broad principles they were setting forth. (p. 54) He recog-
nizes that with vague phrases such as due process, equal protec-
tion, and freedom of speech, this mode of analysis will render 
original meaning largely irrelevant to constitutional interpreta-
tion. For example, the fact that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment "expected racial segregation by law in public 
schools and other public facilities to withstand attack under the 
Equal Protection Clause does not negate the proposition that 
such legally mandated segregation of the races is incompatible 
with the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." (pp. 54-55) 
Similarly, the fact that the framers did not believe capital pun-
ishment was invariably cruel and unusual punishment (as evi-
denced by the unambiguous text of the Fifth Amendment), does 
not mean the death penalty can never be inherently cruel and 
unusual because what is important is the principle they were set-
ting forth not the results they thought would occur. (pp. 55-56) 
This use of original meaning demonstrates Professor Tribe 
doesn't feel it is a particularly important mode of interpretation. 
The problem, however, is that in this same chapter Profes-
sor Tribe states the following: "How defensible would it be to 
ignore evidence of why a provision was enacted, and what peo-
ple generally assumed it would mean, in the process of inter-
preting and applying it? The answer surely is: Not very." (p. 58) 
Professor Tribe just got through telling the reader that the fact 
that those who wrote the Fourteenth Amendment believed it did 
not prohibit racial segregation was largely irrelevant to the 
analysis of that question. But then he argues that we should not 
"ignore evidence of why a provision was enacted and what peo-
ple generally assumed it would mean, in the process of inter-
preting and applying it[.]" It is difficult to reconcile these two 
statements and he presents no argument to that effect. 
Later in the book, Professor Tribe again states that "[T]he 
probable assumptions of many at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's adoption that the forced separation of the races 
would not be deemed a denial of equal protection are ... enti-
tled to no privileged status." (p. 81) Assuming that's a correct 
proposition, shouldn't Professor Tribe concede that original 
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meaning, even when clear and unambiguous, counts for very lit-
tle in hard cases and leave it at that? Similarly, Professor Tribe 
(like the Court) will ignore even unambiguous constitutional text 
if the stakes are important enough as his discussion of the Elev-
enth Amendment, and his failure to discuss the constitutionality 
of the administrative state, amply demonstrate. For the pur-
poses of this review, I have no quarrel with a non-textual, non-
historical method of constitutional interpretation, but Professor 
Tribe shouldn't overstate the role text and history play in consti-
tutional doctrine. 
Professor Tribe's discussion of stare decisis begins with the 
descriptively accurate observation that the Supreme Court's 
constitutional law decisions are "notable, in many famous in-
stances, for their changes of course." (p. 78) He lists the usual 
suspects (Brown, West Coast Hotel, and Garcia among others) to 
support this proposition and then spends several pages justifying 
the Court's willingness to depart from prior cases. These "cor-
rections" don't "revise the underlying constitutional provision or 
structure itself. They aim, instead, to preserve the basic meaning 
of the Constitution by improving one's reading of its terms." (p. 
79) The reworking and overruling of prior cases is defensible 
because the "'course of human events' -in any of its political, 
economic, or social dimensions-is capable of teaching lessons 
that seem to compel one to read the same text in a new way." 
(p. 79) 
After he concludes his defense of the Court's propensity to 
depart from prior cases, Professor Tribe sets forth the justifica-
tion for having a system of stare decisis in the first place. This 
explanation is quite eloquent. Professor Tribe cites John Mar-
shall for the proposition, fundamental to the entire enterprise of 
judicial review, that the Constitution is "LAW" and therefore 
"its interpretation must be constrained by the values of the rule 
of law, which means that courts must construe it through a proc-
ess of reasoning that is replicable, that remains fairly stable, and 
that is consistently applied." (p. 82) (citation omitted) Professor 
Tribe suggests that our system could not work unless judges 
sometimes reach results based on stare decisis they would not 
reach if they were deciding the case for the first time, and cites 
Casey as proof that this happens in the real world. Finally, he 
notes that stare decisis legitimates the "constitutional order" and 
contributes to the "reality and the appearance of the law as im-
personal if not altogether objective." (p. 82) 
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Looking at just the universe of constitutional law cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court, it is hard to take seriously the idea 
that stare decisis plays an important role in the Court's decisions. 
The Court often overrules itself not because new facts come to 
light or new evidence is discovered, but because the personnel 
on the Court changes and new majorities are formed. In recent 
years, the Court has changed its mind on such important issues 
as whether there is a principle of state sovereignty that trumps 
Congress' commerce clause power;11 on whether Congress has 
the power under the commerce clause to abrogate a state's sov-
ereign immunity;12 on whether public school teachers may pro-
vide secular remedial education to children in private religious 
schools;13 and on whether the Eighth Amendment bars a capital 
sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence.1 In 
the federalism area, Justices on both the left and the right can-
didly admit that stare decisis plays little or no role in the Court's 
decisions.15 
In light of the Court's habit of overruling previous cases (a 
practice Professor Tribe concedes exists), an important question 
concerning stare decisis is whether precedent plays a significant 
enough role in constitutional cases to act as a serious constraint 
on the Justices. There is no discussion of this question, nor is 
there even a reference to the fact that sometimes decisions 
change solely because the people on the Court change, in 
American Constitutional Law. Professor Tribe's failure to wres-
tle with this question is especially unsatisfying in light of his con-
cession that the "legally unfettered freedom to choose a 'mean-
ing' that one is free to abandon and replace with another for 
avowedly political reasons is the very essence of making, as op-
posed to genuinely interpreting or discerning [the] law." (pp. 
998-99 n.74) (emphasis removed) As was the case with text and 
originalism, Professor Tribe ducks many of the truly interesting 
11. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
12 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 511 U.S. 44 (1996). 
13. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
14. ·Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
15. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 580 
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he judgment in these cases should be affirmed, 
and I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine 
points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a 
majority of this Court."); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 653-654 (2000) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole 
Tribe ... represents such a radical departure from the proper role of this Court that it 
should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises."). 
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questions surrounding the relationship between precedent and 
constitutional interpretation.16 
Professor Tribe correctly recognizes that one of the great 
questions of constitutional law is what judges should do when 
the various modes of interpretation lead to different results in 
the same case. Therefore, I was most interested to read how 
Professor Tribe was going to answer the following question: 
"[H]aving set forth the several modes or facets of constitutional 
interpretation-text, structure, history, ethos, and doctrine-we 
consider how to proceed if and when those modes of approach 
point in divergent directions." (p. 85) 
Professor Tribe begins to discuss this question by providing 
an example of an indeterminate constitutional question involv-
ing the dormant commerce clause. He persuasively demon-
strates that the various interpretive modes would lead to differ-
ent results. Then he argues there is no way to privilege one 
particular mode of interpretation over another or to create a 
new "metamode" by reference to the Constitution. (p. 88) 
From there he argues against any quest for "a grand unified the-
ory" and says "only a 'candid avowal of the limits of originalism,' 
of every other interpretive technique, and of every effort to 
blend the techniques into an integrated, determinate whole, 'can 
open the process of constitutional interpretation to the full pub-
lic debate without which it partakes only of miracle, mystery, 
and unquestioned authority."' (pp. 88-89) Then, the chapter 
ends. 
Professor Tribe did not present a meaningful analysis of the 
important question of what to do when the various modes of 
constitutional interpretation lead to different results. He has 
avoided this question before, and in a footnote he summarized 
how both Justice Scalia and Ronald Dworkin previously reacted 
16. Professor Tribe also includes a section on nonnative and pragmatic argument. 
(pp. 70-78) He concedes in this chapter that judges inevitably will and should appeal to 
nonnative arguments when engaging in judicial review. (p. 72) The values chosen by 
judges, however, should be rooted in our nation's histories and traditions as well as the 
constitutional text. He argues that "constitutional argument cannot pass muster if it can-
not draw convincingly upon constitutional language, structure, or history." (p. 78) By 
linking nonnative argument with the traditional sources of constitutional interpretation, 
Professor Tribe tries to avoid the indeterminacy problem. The difficulty, of course, is 
that the traditional sources of constitutional interpretation are hopelessly indeterminate 
in the context of actual constitutional cases that make their way to the Supreme Court. 
!his is not to suggest that there are no easy cases, just that the discussion of easy cases is 
Irrelevant to how the Supreme Court should resolve the constitutional cases it decides to 
hear. 
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to his evasion of this fundamental question. Justice Scalia "re-
sponded to this critique of unwarranted certitude by saying that 
he would not 'disparage candor and humility' but finds those 
'qualiti[es] of character [to be] of little use to the judge who must 
determine' how to construe the Constitution." (p. 88 n.14) (cita-
tion omitted) Ronald Dworkin thought Tribe's analysis was 
"innocuous" because "no one but a fool would think his own 
constitutional judgments beyond challenge ... " and because 
everyone knows "'we cannot appeal to shared principles of ei-
ther political morality or constitutional method to demonstrate 
that we are right."' (id.) (citation omitted) 
Professor Tribe refers to these criticisms but does not re-
spond to them. The point Scalia was obviously making, how-
ever, and the question that has loomed large in constitutional 
law beginning with the realists and continuing with the critical 
legal scholars, is that the indeterminacy of constitutional inter-
pretation at the Supreme Court level of decision making may 
suggest a reduced role for the Supreme Court in our political 
system. If reasonable people can differ over what the Constitu-
tion means in any given case, then perhaps the final decision 
about what the Constitution means in that case ought to be 
made by the legislature, the executive, or in the case of popular 
initiatives, the people. Commentators on both the left and the 
right, such as Mark Tushnet and Robert Bork, have started to 
question the wisdom of any system of judicial review for similar 
reasons.17 
The legitimacy of judicial review in a post-realist world is a 
fundamental question of American constitutional law. In 1381 
pages, however, the best Professor Tribe can offer is the follow-
mg: 
One virtue of the thought experiment undertaken in the pre-
ceding paragraphs is that it brings out in bold relief the neces-
sarily indeterminate character of constitutional interpretation 
conducted through attention to text, structure, history, ethos, 
and doctrine. Whether or not one believes that, in principle, 
there exist identifiable 'right answers' to all questions of con-
stitutional law, the institutional environment within which 
constitutional interpretation and adjudication take place is 
such that, by the very nature of the beast, there will be a spec-
17. See generally Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberal-
ism and American Decline (Harper Collins, 1996); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution 
Away from the Couns (Princeton U. Press, 1999). 
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trum or range of at least arguably right answers to such ques-
tions. The nihilists who reach the facile conclusion that, there-
fore, everything is permitted and that there are no constraints 
are surely wrong. For there are plenty of wrong answers, an-
swers that are wrong beyond any real debate, and their very 
existence testifies to the falsity of the boast that anything 
goes. (pp. 93-94) 
435 
This response to the realist critique attacks a strawman. No 
one argues there are no wrong answers to constitutional ques-
tions, but many believe that the relative indeterminacy of consti-
tutional law (which Professor Tribe concedes exists) raises diffi-
cult questions about the wisdom of a political system where 
strong judicial review by an unelected judiciary plays a signifi-
cant role. The evasion of this question has always been a prob-
lem in American Constitutional Law, but in the Third Edition 
Professor Tribe promises for the first time a discussion of the 
"competing and complementary approaches to constitutional in-
terpretation . . . [and] the relationship of those approaches to 
one another and to alternative theories of what the Constitution 
is for and of what, if anything, makes it (and the judiciary's 
power to enforce it) 'legitimate."' (p. v) This task was not even 
remotely accomplished by Professor Tribe's new section on con-
stitutional interpretation and the legitimacy of judicial review. 
II. CASELAW 
Professor Tribe's methodology for discussing constitutional 
issues is consistent throughout the book. He begins with text, 
history, and relevant case law. These descriptive accounts are 
comprehensive, accurate and exceedingly informative. Ameri-
can Constitutional Law provides a voluminous amount of helpful 
information for those interested in specific constitutional law 
questions. 
Following his descriptive accounts, Professor Tribe usually 
provides an opinion as to the correctness of the doctrine or case 
he is describing. How he performs this task is vital to the success 
of the treatise because such judgments take up much of the 
book, and because American Constitutional Law is remarkably 
influential. As Professor Schauer observed ten years ago, 
American Constitutional Law is more a part of constitutional law 
than a book about constitutionallaw,18 and a citation to the trea-
18. See Schauer, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 1410 (cited in note 3). 
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tise appears to be roughly equivalent to a citation to non-binding 
judicial authority.19 
It would certainly be possible to write an informative trea-
tise on constitutional law and avoid taking positions on how 
cases should be resolved. Professor Chemerinsky has written 
such a book.20 Professor Tribe's agenda, however, seems quite 
different. The doctrine he describes seems to be a place setting 
for the articulation of the results he prefers. The remainder of 
this review is primarily concerned, therefore, not with how well 
Professor Tribe describes constitutional doctrine, but with his 
method of justifying proposed solutions to difficult constitutional 
questions. 
A. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
In the previous edition of his book, Professor Tribe seemed 
to support the line of cases in which the Court abandoned the 
enforcement of internal limits on Congress' commerce clause 
power. He stated the following: 
[T]he interests that would be served by a judicial doctrine 
limiting the commerce power are also interests likely to be 
represented in ordinary congressional processes of deci-
sion .... If there is a role for the judiciary here, it ought to be 
defined primarily as one of encouraging the legislative proc-
esses autonomously to set the limits of congressional power. 
And it is largely this role that the Supreme Court has as-
sumed.21 
In the third edition, however, Professor Tribe has appar-
ently changed his mind. He argues that the Court correctly de-
cided in United States v. Lopez,22 that the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990, which criminalized the possession of guns 
near schools, exceeded Congress' powers. Lopez is a difficult 
case, and I am not concerned with Professor Tribe's agreement 
with the result but rather how he explains why he thinks the de-
cision was correct. Like Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the 
19. A Westlaw search turned up a staggering 2843 citations to the Second Edition 
of the Treatise in law review articles and, much more importantly, 147 citations in the 
federal court system. 
20. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies (Aspen 
Law & Business, 1997). 
21. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 314 n.2 (Foundation Press, 
Inc., 2d ed. 1988). 
22. 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
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Court, Professor Tribe failed to engage in a discussion of the real 
issue in the case. 
Here is Professor Tribe's descriptive account of the Lopez 
holding: 
Lopez's discussion of the 'substantial effects' test reveals that, 
rather than focusing on the quantity of the regulated activity's 
effects, the Court was attempting to reconfigure its precedents 
to focus more attention on the nature of the underlying activ-
ity-paying particular attention to whether or not that activity 
could itself be described as part of an economic enterprise. In 
Lopez the Court reaffirmed its decisions upholding federal 
laws regulating such intrastate activities as coal mining, loan 
sharking, running a restaurant, running a hotel, and producing 
wheat for home consumption . . . . The key move in Lopez 
was the Court's characterization of these prior cases as in-
volving 'intrastate economic activity.' This post-hoc recon-
figuration of the cases may suggest that, absent a jurisdic-
tional tie to interstate commerce or regulation of the channels 
or instrumentalities of such commerce, the focus of the 
Court's attention-as long as Lopez survives-will not be 
simply on whether the cumulative or aggregated effects on in-
terstate commerce of an intrastate activity can be called sub-
stantial, but rather on whether there is a colorable claim [em-
phasis added] that the intrastate activity itself is 'commercial' 
or 'economic.' (p. 819) (emphasis added)23 ???? 
In footnotes scattered throughout the section on Lopez, 
Professor Tribe expresses satisfaction with the commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction; supports the Court's efforts to 
try and articulate some limit on Congress' commerce clause 
power; and suggests that the statute in Lopez should have been 
struck down by the Court because a "conclusion that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act came within Congress' commerce 
power ... would seem to leave everything within Congress' 
power, down to the last nail." (p. 818 n.45) Professor Tribe 
supports these conclusions by noting, as did the Court, that nei-
ther the government at oral argument nor the dissenting Justices 
provided examples of activity that would be beyond Congress' 
commerce clause powers nor tried to explain why the "demand 
for such an example was somehow illegitimate." (p. 818 nn.45-
46) 
23. The Supreme Court recently validated Professor Tribe's interpretation of Lo-
pez in United States v. Morrison, 120 S. a. 1740 (2000) (invalidating civil remedy provi-
sions of the Violence Against Women Act). 
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This defense of the result in Lopez should have required 
Professor Tribe to address the arguments made by the govern-
ment and dissenting Justices, and here is the black hole. Justice 
Breyer's dissent included an appendix of 167 reports concerning 
the relationship between guns, education, and the economy. 
Nowhere in the treatise, and for that matter nowhere in the 
Court's decision, is there a discussion of why significant threats 
to the educational process do not involve commercial or eco-
nomic activity (or at least a "colorable claim" to that effect). 
Professor Tribe's discussion of this point is found in two foot-
notes. In note 45 on page 818, he summarily states the following: 
Mere possession of a handgun has no obvious connection to 
interstate commerce; there were no findings or legislative his-
tory alleging any effect of handgun possession as such on 
commerce; and the statute lacked a jurisdictional requirement 
that would have limited its scope to firearms that did have 
some connection to or [have an] effect on interstate com-
merce .... The United States attempted to argue that guns 
were special because of their pervasive and at times shattering 
effects on society, but any product can obviously have signifi-
cant effects-depending on how it is used. 
This argument is not persuasive. The Gun-Free School 
Zones Act did not prohibit mere gun possession, but specifically 
the possession of guns near schools. There is no debate that 
guns and schools do not mix well (to say the least) and that the 
deterioration of our schools affects (and is therefore related to 
and part of) both local economies and our nation's economic 
situation as a whole. These arguments are supported by the vo-
luminous materials contained in the appendix to Justice Breyer's 
dissent, but ignored in the treatise. Moreover, Justice Breyer 
countered the Court's fear that upholding the law would mean 
that Congress could regulate all aspects of the educational proc-
ess by pointing out that guns present a "particularly acute" 
threat to that process.24 This qualifier is not mentioned in Pro-
fessor Tribe's discussion of the case. 
Having ignored Justice Breyer's factual arguments, here is 
Professor Tribe's response to the dissent's contention that Con-
gress could have rationally found that violent crime in school 
zones substantially affects commerce because of its threat to 
education: 
24. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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The problem with this test is exposed by the fact that one 
could freely substitute just about any problem for 'violent 
crime in school zones.': Why not 'rampant divorce' or 'the 
wearing of tight shorts'? For that matter, one could substitute 
nearly anything for 'education,' as well. A resourceful legisla-
tor (or legislative assistant) could likely compile an impressive 
array of materials connecting just about any activity to the na-
tional economy. (p. 818 n.47) 
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Even under the Court's and Professor Tribe's test, however, 
we have to wrestle with the following problem: Is gun possession 
around schools an economic or commercial activity? This is a 
hard question that cannot be persuasively answered by reference 
to legal doctrine (text, precedent and history). Gun possession 
in close proximity to banks is certainly an economic activity, gun 
possession around zoos probably not, and gun possession around 
schools, maybe. Justice Breyer believed acute threats to the 
educational process fell on the economic side of the equation 
and attached numerous studies to his appendix to support that 
conclusion. Professor Tribe did not attempt to rebut that judg-
ment or define in any meaningful way what he meant by com-
mercial activity, other than to make clear that wheat grown for 
home consumption is such activity, but possessing a gun around 
a school is not. In his failure to truly engage the only question 
that the legal doctrine he embraced made relevant, his analysis 
fell into the black hole. 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 
Professor Tribe spends a considerable amount of time de-
fending the result in INS v. Chadha,25 though he concedes Justice 
Burger's majority opinion "begs the question ... whether mem-
bers of Congress are constitutionally acceptable delegatees of 
powers that Congress could constitutionally delegate to the Ex-
ecutive or to an independent agency." (pp. 145-46) This is the 
important issue in the case because both the government and 
Justice White argued that executive branch personnel constitu-
tionally make law without going through bicameralism and pre-
sentment, and therefore the Court shouldn't treat the legislative 
veto any differently. Professor Tribe correctly points out that 
Justice Burger's response to this argument amounted to the ipse 
dixit that when the executive makes decisions that affect legal 
25. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto). 
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rights the action is executive, but when Congress does so the ac-
tion is legislative. (id.) Incredibly, after he points out the 
Court's deficiency, Professor Tribe falls into the very same black 
hole. Virtually all of the analysis of this question is contained in 
the following paragraph on page 146: 
It might seem arbitrary to require, as the Chadha majority 
implicitly did, that members of Congress must act according 
to the rules applicable to their lawmaking capacity even when 
discharging duties delegated to them by statute, while not in-
sisting that members of the executive or judicial branches be 
deemed to act purely in their executive or judicial capacities 
when they exercise delegated power. Yet even if the Court 
failed to explain fully its return to a form of constitutional 
exegesis that appears to deal in 'legislative' and 'executive' es-
sences, the decision in Chadha is not without solid structural 
grounding in the Constitution's design. The Framers re-
garded the legislature as the most dangerous branch, and even 
two centuries later it remains a plausible proposition to many 
that there is more to fear when Congress-which is the source 
of all statutorily delegated authority-delegates not to the 
other branches, but to itself. 
Although it is true the framers feared Congress more than 
the President, in twenty-first century America it is difficult to 
support the proposition that Congress poses a greater risk of tyr-
anny than the Executive Branch. Certainly, the argument needs 
to be made, not assumed. Moreover, our current administrative 
state would shock the framers just as much as the legislative veto 
inasmuch as the executive branch routinely promulgates regula-
tions with the force of law and holds judicial-type hearings. Thus, 
even though Chadha cannot be persuasively defended or re-
jected on purely historical or textual grounds, Professor Tribe 
supports the result without engaging in a full-blown discussion of 
the institutional arguments on both sides of the question, and 
therein lies the black hole. Finally, he gives the game away when 
he notes that "it remains a plausible proposition to many that 
there is more to fear when Congress" delegates to itself than to 
the President. I would have hoped Professor Tribe would not 
advocate the invalidation of an act of a coordinate branch of 
government on the basis of a "plausible proposition," as opposed 
to clear constitutional text or unambiguous historical authority. 
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C. THE LINE ITEM VETO 
Professor Tribe takes a similarly formalistic approach to 
Clinton v. City of New York.26 The issue in Clinton was the con-
stitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act which gave the President 
the authority to "cancel" certain types of spending and taxing 
provisions of duly enacted laws. The President was required to 
give Congress notice of such a cancellation within five days after 
a law's enactment. The Congress could then reject a cancella-
tion with two thirds majorities in both houses, subject to Presi-
dential veto, and then congressional override. (pp. 744-45) 
The Supreme Court held that the Line Item Veto Act vio-
lated the Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7.n According 
to the Court, that clause requires a President to veto an entire 
bill, not part of one, and he must do so before, not after, it be-
comes a law.28 Additionally, the Court decided that the absence 
of any constitutional support for a partial cancellation authorit~ 
amounted to "an express prohibition" of any such authority. 9 
Professor Tribe agreed substantially with this analysis. (pp. 740-
53) 
The most difficult issue raised by Clinton is easy to identify. 
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the cancellation authority 
given the President in the Line Item Veto Act was not materially 
different from the authority Presidents have often exercised to 
decline to spend appropriated funds.30 Professor Tribe cites the 
following as the relevant portion of Scalia's argument: 
'Insofar as the degree of political, 'lawmaking' power con-
ferred upon the Executive is concerned, there is not a dime's 
worth of difference between Congress' authorizing the Presi-
dent to cancel a spending item, and Congress' authorizing 
money to be spent on a particular item at the President's dis-
cretion' which 'ha[d] been done since the Founding of the Na-
tion.' (p. 747) (citation omitted) 
26. 524 u.s. 417 (1998). 
27. Article I, Section 7 provides the following in pertinent part: "Every Bill which 
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a 
Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but 
if not he shall return it, with his Objections to the House in which it shall have origi-
nated .... " 
28. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439. 
29. Id. 
30. See id. at 466-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Scalia cited numerous examples to support this argument in-
cluding a 1934 law which appropriated almost a billion dollars 
"for such projects and/or purposes and under such rules and 
regulations as the President in his discretion may prescribe. "31 
The dissent did not believe there was a constitutional distinction 
between the exercise of this authority and the power given the 
President in the Line Item Veto Act. In both circumstances, the 
President was given discretion to decline to spend appropriated 
funds pursuant to laws enacted in conformity with Article I, Sec-
tion 7. 
The majority opinion ducked this argument by arguing that 
the Line Item Veto Act allowed the President to alter the text of 
a law whereas the discretionary appropriation bills relied upon 
by Scalia did not involve the actual physical changing of the 
text.32 Obviously, no reasonable person would equate that ut-
terly formalistic response with a full blown argument. Professor 
Tribe adopts a slightly different approach, although not one that 
keeps him from being pulled into the black hole. 
Professor Tribe suggests that when the President is given 
the discretion not to spend money based on changed facts he is 
implementing a policy choice made by Congress, but when he 
has the authority to cancel an item of direct spending he has the 
"unilateral power simply to repeal part of a law that he thinks is 
not in the national interest and thus essentially to promulgate an 
amended law never enacted by Congress." (p. 748) The laws 
cited by Justice Scalia, however, contained extremely vague sub-
stantive terms such that the President's discretion was not effec-
tively cabined, and in effect he retained a continuing power to 
veto (or cancel) what Congress had decided without clear con-
gressional guidance.33 Moreover, the Line Item Veto Act went 
through bicameralism and presentment, and therefore in imple-
menting that law the President was also implementing a policy 
choice made by Congress through constitutionally acceptable 
means. Of course, if Congress disagreed with the President's 
cancellation, it could have passed a new law just like if Congress 
disagreed with a Presidential decision to not spend allocated 
funds it could enact new legislation requiring the funds be spent. 
31. Id. at 467. 
32. See id. at 446-47. 
33. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892) (holding that Congress had the 
power to delegate to the President the ability to ind~finitely suspend free ~po~tion 
laws against countries which he "deem(ed]" to be unfauly and unequally dealing Wlth the 
United States). 
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Professor Tribe also argued that the "Line Item Veto Act 
allows the President, having signed a statute into law, immedi-
ately to reject part of that law and thereby to reject the specific 
policy choice just made by Congress. This is functionally far dif-
ferent from what occurs under a law in which Congress expresses 
a policy that certain of the measures it is provisionally putting 
into place should be rendered ineffectual based on future con-
tingencies." (pp. 748-49) This argument, however, is a non se-
quitur. The laws cited by Justice Scalia did not specify "future 
contingencies," but gave the President broad discretion to decide 
for himself whether large sums of money should be spent and for 
what items.34 Even the majority opinion in Clinton recognized 
that under the laws cited by the dissenting opinions and the gov-
ernment, the President was often "given wide discretion with re-
spect to both the amounts to be spent and how the money would 
be allocated among different functions."35 The truly difficult 
question raised by Clinton, therefore, was whether the Line Item 
Veto Act could be distinguished from these laws. A thorough 
discussion of this issue, both in the case and in American Con-
stitutional Law, fell into the black hole. 
Perhaps because Professor Tribe couldn't meet the dissent-
ing arguments head on, he also argues generally for a textualist-
formalist approach to separation of powers cases. He spends 
several pages arguing about the dangers of Presidential law-
making and how if "Congress may give the President power to 
strike provisions of appropriations statutes after they are en-
acted and signed into law, then there is no reason why the Presi-
dent could not likewise be given power to 'cancel' all or part of 
any duly enacted civil rights laws ... or to 'rescind' pollution 
laws that he deems a burden to the economy, or to 'prevent from 
having legal force' any other previously enacted measure signed 
by the President into law that he would rather do without." (pp. 
749-50) This Presidential veto power is inconsistent with Article 
I's "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered proce-
dure" for national lawmaking. (p. 749, citing Chadha) 
The problem with this analysis is that Professor Tribe does 
not explain why the Line Item Veto Act provides the President 
too much authority, but all of the other executive lawmaking 
conducted by the Executive Branch (such as rule making pursu-
ant to hopelessly vague delegations) passes constitutional mus-
34. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 466-67 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
35. Id. at 446. 
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ter. Much of the work of the Executive Branch is just as incon-
sistent with Article l's "finely wrought and exhaustively consid-
ered procedure" as the Line Item Veto Act's cancellation 
authority. Thus, another difficult question raised by Clinton is 
why the President is prohibited from canceling laws pursuant to 
congressional authority but not prohibited from actually enact-
ing laws pursuant to that authority? The attempt to answer this 
question by a reference to the quotation from Chadha that Arti-
cle I contains a "finely wrought and exhaustively considered 
procedure," is unpersuasive. 
I feel compelled to make one more point about Professor 
Tribe's textualist-formalist approach to separation of powers 
cases. Although he uses that approach to justify the outcomes in 
Chadha and Clinton, when it comes to the problem of non-
Article III courts exercising federal judicial power, Professor 
Tribe sounds like a Justice White type functionalist. He criti-
cizes Justice Brennan's formalist reasoning in Northern Pipe-
line,36 and seems to support the results in Thomas,n and Schor,38 
as well as the case-by-case balancing test articulated in those two 
decisions. (pp. 293-97) He never explains, however, why he pre-
fers a functionalist approach to these separation of powers cases 
but a formalist approach to Chadha and Clinton. This inconsis-
tency jeopardizes Professor Tribe's attempt to provide a "unified 
analysis of constitutional law," (p. xv) inasmuch as he fails to 
provide such an account of just separation of powers cases. 
In Lopez, Chadha, and Clinton, text, history, and doctrine 
run out before the hard work can be done. Yet, in all three 
cases, the Court and Professor Tribe's treatise proceed as if their 
reliance on traditional legal materials can persuasively support 
the judgments. Although there is nothing particularly new in 
this critique, it is disappointing that Professor Tribe's mode of 
analysis has not changed since the first edition was published 
twenty-two years ago. Professor Tribe could have provided a 
great service if, instead of employing the same tired manipula-
36. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982) (invalidating on separation of powers grounds the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, which 
allowed non-Article III judges to decide state law claims related to bankruptcy proceed-
ings). 
37. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (up-
holding mandatory arbitration by non-Article III judges in certain pesticide registration 
disputes). 
38. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (up-
holding jurisdiction of federal agency to hear state law counterclaims). 
2000] BOOK REVIEWS 445 
tions of standard legal doctrine, he actually came out and made 
transparent the reasons he fears Congress more than the Presi-
dent; or explained why serious threats to our schools do not pre-
sent the kind of economic risks Congress can regulate under the 
commerce clause; or why the veto of legislation by the President 
pursuant to congressional authorization threatens the separation 
of powers more than the passing of legislation by the Executive 
Branch pursuant to congressional authorization. Although it is 
unlikely any one scholar, even Professor Tribe, could undertake 
such an analysis with regard to the universe of constitutional law 
issues, that inevitability argues in favor of a treatise with much 
less normative argument, like Professor Chemerinsky's, or a less 
comprehensive project. It does not excuse the pretense that 
judges and scholars can resolve hard constitutional questions on 
the basis of indeterminate doctrine. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Professor Tribe's treatise is a perfect reflection of how con-
stitutional law is practiced by the United States Supreme Court. 
The Court's constitutional decisions play lip service to legal doc-
trine, while the Court's results appear to be based on political 
value judgments. The same can be said of much of American 
Constitutional Law. His project is "characterized as much by un-
resolved conflict as by unity. In this respect, the work accurately 
reflects the field it attempts to capture. "39 Like the Supreme 
Court, Professor Tribe consistently understates the doctrinal in-
coherence present in the cases and issues he purports to resolve. 
Professor Tribe is no doubt the preeminent constitutional 
litigator of this generation. Moreover, his opinion on how con-
stitutional questions should be resolved no doubt makes a sig-
nificant difference to judges and scholars. Measured by the 
standard of influence, American Constitutional Law is a remark-
able success. Professor Tribe could do the academy a greater 
service, however, if he used his formidable abilities to try and 
improve how constitutional law is practiced instead of just en-
gaging in the standard manipulations of text, history, precedent 
and policy. That's been done many times before. 
39. Lupu, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1321 (cited in note 3). 
